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LAW REVIEW

INTRODUCTION TO "THE SILENT WORLD OF
DOCTOR AND PATIENT"
ALEXANDER MORGAN CAPRON·

I never cease being amazed how early reticence and evasion ap
pear in physicians-to-be. In the first session of the "Medicine I Ethics
Conference" taken by all third-year medical students at the University
of Southern California, my two colleagues from medicine and ethics
and I sometimes ask the students to tell us how they will introduce
themselves to the patients for whom they will be caring during their
six-week rotation through the Student Ward at LA County/USC Hos
pital. "As part of the medical team," say some, while more reply,
"As Doctor So-and-So." A few suggest "student-physician," but
others report feeling more comfortable with "medical student." The
point of the class session is not to insist that they all adopt a particular
term. Rather, we hope that they will recognize what might seem a
minor matter as something of considerable importance: their first con
tact with a patient in which the foundation for the relationship is set,
and an early test of their commitment to candor in that relationship.
Why, we ask the students who introduce themselves as "Doctor"
or try to give that impression, is that term appropriate? Because they
are going to touch the patients, to probe them physically and verbally,
these students reply. Patients would accept such intimacies only from
a physician. How do they know that, I wonder? Is this decision a
reflection of how they will behave during the coming years as practi
tioners? Will they act like scientists and test their assumptions about
patients' reactions, or will they enshrine their own reactions and fears,
* Topping Professor of Law, Medicine and Public Policy, University of Southern
California; B.A., Swarthmore College, 1966; LL.B., Yale Law School, 1969.
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along with the "received wisdom" of their peers and predecessors, as
truths that do not need to be examined? ("Never tell patients they
have cancer-they don't want to know and they'll give up hope and
kill themselves if you do!"!)
Moreover, I inquire, what-besides a misrepresentation of their
stage of education-are the students telling patients when they use the
term "Doctor"? That they want a certain level of deference? That
being "Doctor" will explain why they employ strange, Latinate words
that the patients find difficult to understand? What different sort of
message would be given if the term "student-physician" were used?
Would that signify that the person bearing such a title is asking the
patient for permission to learn by practicing (in the ordinary meaning
of that word) with the patient? Such an implicit request clearly makes
some students uncomfortable. Why? Because a patient might say
"No, thank you, I want someone else"? Or even because it would alter
the usual balance of power and authority and make the patient the
teacher of the medical student, or, at the very least, make the two
collaborators?
Of course, my questions tend to be especially pointed for this first
group of students. But I also am fascinated to hear the rationales
given by those who want to avoid any use of the word "physician" in
explaining themselves to patients, and who instead adhere rigorously
to the term "medical student." Why are they so modest? Their com
ments suggest that they view themselves as mere students who don't
yet know much about illness and treatment, and who are insignificant
foot soldiers just carrying out the orders of real doctors. Does this
allow them to avoid some sense of responsibility, including having to
answer patients' questions or having to explain what they are doing
and why? Do these students imagine that when they obtain their
medical degrees they will "have all the answers" --and will feel com
fortable giving these answers to patients?
I ask them whether the uncertainty they say explains their modest
self-description is just a manifestation of their novice status, or will
this uncertainty remain as long as they practice medicine? If so, are
they trying to come to terms with it by saying "student" (as we are all
perpetual students of the world if we are lucky)? Or perhaps they are
trying to deny the ignorance they feel, to make it seem almost laughaI. In the 1960s, studies found exactly such fears among physicians, based not on
logic and rational decision but on "opinion, belief, and conviction, heavily weighted with
emotional justification." Oken, What to Tell Cancer Patients-A Study 0/ Medical Atti
tudes, 175 J. A.M.A. 1120, 1125 (1961). See generally B. GLASER & A. STRAUSS,
AWARENESS OF DYING (1965).
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ble, just as they employ gallows humor among themselves to defuse
the tension that accompanies their first, fumbling attempts at technical
procedures that they know they will master in time.
Perhaps I should not feel a moment's surprise at what I hear from
these students. The particular mode of self-introduction to patients
that each student adopts is not merely one for which he or she can give
some rationale but is one that, when questioned, many admit is com
fortable precisely because it fulfills the need to avoid those particular
types of interactions (or feared confrontations) with patients that each
student finds individually distressing. I should not be surprised by my
students' answers because The Silent World of Doctor and Patient 2
makes so abundantly clear that these inclinations lie at the very heart
of the traditional practice of medicine, as well as the other professions.
This issue of the Western New England Law Review is devoted to
that remarkable book. In effect, this journal is a festschrift for the
book's author, Jay Katz, M.D., the John A. Garver Professor of Law
and Psychoanalysis at Yale Law School. Professor Katz has written
on many other topics,3 and has even explored the topic of physician
patient relations and informed consent in earlier books and articles. 4
But The Silent World is the summary of his thinking on this subject,
and to celebrate it is thus to celebrate him. Not that all the contribu
tors to this journal think of themselves as doing that, of course. Yet
even when viewed by a critic, the book bears the mark of greatness: it
provokes hard thinking on a difficult issue and forces those who disa
gree to reexamine their views and defend them in a new fashion.
Professor Katz's book, which is dedicated to improving commu
nication between physicians and patients, tells a story of mispercep
tions and failed communications between the medical profession and
the larger society. In particular, it finds the manifestations of society's
views in the apparently sweeping but actually very timid judicial opin
ions on "informed consent." For example, even when they most
boldly declare the obligation of physicians to enter into candid discus
sions and mutual decisionmaking with patients, judges, in Professor
2.

J.

KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT

(1984) [hereinafter

KATZ].

3. See, e.g., his three pioneering casebooks, J. GOLDSTEIN & J. KATZ, THE FAMILY
AND THE LAW (1965); J. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN & A. DERSHOWITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS,
PSYCHIATRY AND LAW (1967); J. KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS
(1972).
, 4. See, e.g., J. KATZ & A. CAPRON, CATASTROPHIC DISEASES: WHO DECIDES
WHAT? 79-115 (1974); Katz, Disclosure and Consent: In Search of Their Roots, in GENET
ICS AND THE LAW II 121 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1980); Katz, Informed Consent
A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 137 (1977).
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Katz's view, so misunderstand the training and traditions of the medi
cal profession that their rulings are self-defeating. 5 Professor Katz
would probably concur with Lord Scarman's observation that "Can
terbury propositions reflect a legal truth which too much judicial reli
ance on medical judgment tends to obscure."6
What is so valuable about The Silent World ofDoctor and Patient,
however, is that it goes far beyond merely cataloguing and criticizing
the judicial opinions. Instead, Professor Katz sets out to understand
the difficulties that stand in the way of communication and mutual
decisionmaking in the physician-patient relationship; he then presents
a strong moral and practical argument in favor of overcoming this
silence and the lack of true trust that it breeds. As a psychoanalyst, he
draws on a wide range of sources to establish that the phenomenon at
issue is not unique to physician-patient interactions but reflects human
beings' resistance "to get to know themselves and each other better
through conversation" (p. xiv). Professor Katz also operates as an
historian and sociologist in this volume; nor is he hesitant to draw on
literature, such as Solzhenitsyn's Cancer Ward. 7 In the end, however,
Professor Katz's role is that of a medical moralist calling upon his
fellow physicians to overcome their fears of revealing their doubts and
uncertainties, and to set aside their misguided notions of benevolence.
By respecting patients' capacity for self-determination, physicians will
find their relationships with patients more genuinely human, more
t:motionally satisfying, and more ethically justifiable. 8
5. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In Canterbury,
Judge Robinson held that physicians need only disclose what would be material to the
average, reasonable patient because this is a standard that physicians are equipped to apply,
on account of their medical training and experience. Id. at 786-87. Not only does this
"reasonable patient" standard vitiate any notion, for which Canterbury supposedly stands,
that the law protects the individual and subjective wishes of people about their own medical
tare, but it also rests on the misconception that medical training provides physicians with
an empirical basis for knowing what the average person wants to know about his or her
treatment. The court's deference to medical standards here is particularly ironic, as Profes
sor Katz argues, KATZ, supra note 2, at 77-78, because Judge Robinson had earlier held
that the information to be disclosed to patients could not be left to medical standards be
cause it is doubtful that there is any true custom, any "professional consensus on communi
cation of option and risk information to patients...." Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 783.
6. Sidaway v. Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hosp., [1985] 2 W.L.R. 480,
494.
7. A. I. SOLZHENITSYN, CANCER WARD (1969).
8. The ethical justification of the position taken by Katz is explored further in R.
FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986),
which develops the philosophical aspects of the subject with great care. In particular,
Professors Faden and Beauchamp develop two senses of informed consent; the first, "au
tonomous authorization," corresponds closely to what Professor Katz sees as the outcome
of the communicative process he recommends, while Sense2 informed consent corresponds
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Professor Katz so persuasively builds the case that silence has
been a cornerstone of medical practice since ancient times that he may
seem unlikely to convince those to whom his argument is most cen
trally addressed. Yet perhaps there is some reason for hope.
First, biomedical advances in recent years not only equip physi
cians with formidable tools for attacking disease and disability, they
also provide physicians with an enormous amount of reliable informa
tion; unlike their predecessors in earlier centuries, practitioners today
have something besides puzzlement, ignorance, and misconceptions to
share with their patients. Of course, the greater powers of medicine
also create a greater range of alternative treatments-and ultimately
greater scope for divergence between the wishes or interests of patient
and physician.
Second, despite Professor Katz's justifiable scorn for the judges'
unwillingness to craft legal rules that would give real effect to the
grand principles they proclaim, physicians seem to have listened to
and been affected by-the judicial opinions as well as other writings of
physicians and bioethicists that defend and elaborate upon the princi
ples. However uncomfortable they may be with the obligation, and
however much they may misunderstand and sometimes ridicule the
legal requirement, physicians believe themselves to be under a moral
and legal obligation to obtain their patients' informed consent to treat
ment. 9 Granted that for many of them this obligation is seen in fairly
mechanical terms-such that these physicians equate "informed con
sent" with the "consent form." It is not unusual to hear a physician
ask whether someone has "consented the patient," which probably ac
curately conveys the speaker's view that consent is something that is
done to a patient rather than a process in which both physician and
patient take part.
Nonetheless, as far as this may fall from any true notion of con
sent, it indicates at least a recognition that someone other than physi
cians has a stake in medical decisions and that society expects
physicians to bring patients into the decisionmaking process. This
idea may hardly seem startling, but as anyone who has been teaching
medical students for several decades can testify, it represents an amaz
ing evolution in their professed beliefs on the subject of patient conto the rules for consent established by the law, which often departs from Sensei' See id. at
277-87.
9. See, e.g., I PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS
IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE
DECISIONS 70-111 (1982) (reporting results of national study of physicians' attitudes to
ward informed consent).
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sent. Therefore, the question becomes: what model of the physician
patient relationship will the profession adopt? If we are fortunate, it
will be Jay Katz's.
As the readers of this symposium will discover, Professor Katz's
theory is rich and provocative. Yet his central tenet can be stated
fairly simply: it is that, for both ethical and practical reasons, the phy
sician-patient relationship must be a mutual one involving both parties
as active and respected participants. This is possible only through bi
lateral conversation in which both persons explore their expectations
as well as their fears, and their knowledge as well as their uncertain
ties. Ultimately, patients will have the final say about their treatment,
but patients' decisions can only be "informed" if physicians take seri
ously the need for conversation and not merely ritual "disclosures."
Although the book focuses more on the need for reform of physicians'
attitudes and behavior-rather than supplying a "how to" guide for
patients-in Professor Katz's model, obligations do not rest solely
with physicians. Rather, he grounds respect for self-determination not
merely on the external component of choice but also on an internal
component, reflection, which is part of the mutual obligation of both
parties.
Professor Katz is very aware of the forces, both personal and pro
fessional, that make his vision of informed consent seem utopian. In
deed, he sees the pattern as age-old, a conclusion he backs up with
sources from the dawn of medicine to the present day (pp. 1-47).\0
Nevertheless, Professor Katz attempts to persuade physicians that if
they tear down the wall of silence that separates them from their pa
tients they will not only better respect their patients' rights but will
derive greater rewards from the enriched human relationship. The au
thors in this collection explore and take issue with this thesis and its
application in a variety of settings.
I.

PATERNALISM: NECESSARY EVIL, OR JUST NECESSARY?

Given the tocsin sounded by Professor Katz, it is fitting that the
10. Katz characterizes as ineffectual exceptions to this rule the writings of various
physicians and scholars over many centuries who argued for greater disclosure by physi
cians and respect for the wishes of patients; other commentators have taken the view that
these sources indicate a divided tradition in medicine, with some authorities favoring the
sort of relationship that Katz envisions. See, e.g., Pemick, The Patient's Role in Medical
Decisionmaking: A Social History of Informed Consent in Medical Therapy, in 3 PRESI
DENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BI
OMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS I (1982)
(truth-telling and consent-seeking have long been part of an indigenous tradition in
medicine, based on their beneficial effects on health).
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first essay in this collection takes sharp issue with both his diagnosis
and his prescription. II Thomas P. Duffy, a professor of medicine at
Professor Katz's own institution, faults The Silent World of Doctor
and Patient for its too heavy concentration on the actions of surgeons,
ignoring the path that leads the patient to the "villain-surgeon,"12 a
path on which Doctor Duffy identifies the family physician as the pa
tient's guide. Doctor Duffy acknowledges that "lapses [exist] in the
system,"13 but he laments that Professor Katz's emphasis on auton
omy will further isolate patients, leaving them more vulnerable. Be
cause illness already renders patients vulnerable, they are better served
by a profession dedicated to paternalism than to autonomy.
Thus, the heart of the disagreement between Duffy and Katz is
that the former believes that patients will do best to rely on "a trust
worthy Diogenes"14 to lead them through the health care maze. Duffy
takes trust to be the norm-actual and ideal-of the physician-patient
relationship while Katz believes that trust must rest on truth and mu
tual assent and not on patients' obedience and compliance. Duffy
agrees that conversation is important, but he doubts that physicians
can usually ac:hieve the degree of knowledge of patients' inner work
ings that might emerge from years of psychoanalysis. Outside the lat
ter setting (in which Professor Katz practices), Doctor Duffy suggests,
medicine possesses sufficient scientific certainty to render Katz's insis
tence on the disclosure of uncertainty neither realistic nor necessary.
Turning Professor Katz's description of the fate of an illustrative
patient he calls Iphigenia Jones to his own purposes, Doctor Duffy
argues that not all patients are sacrificial victims, nor should physi
cians-triumphant now in their return from a biomedical Troy-be
subject to Agamemnon's fate, namely, death at the hands of the law as
the avenger of wronged patienthood. Doctor Duffy laments what he
sees as the result: an increasingly adversarial relationship between
physician and patient. Although he admits that some of this may have
been brought on by the failure of physicians in some instances to con
trol "the reign of technology," 15 he thinks patients will derive greater
protection from "beneficence and altruism" 16 than from "thoroughgo
11.

Duffy, Agamemnon's Fate and the Medical Profession, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.

21 (1987).

Id. at 23.
13. Id.
14. Id.
12.

15.

/d. at 25.

16.

Id. at 26.
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ing self-determination."17 The reader may then wish to ask: with
changes in the incentives in the system of delivering and paying for
health care--especially with expenditure-controls that aim to limit
"unnecessary" treatment-which prescription is more likely to protect
patients' interests and well-being? Indeed, is it possible to protect both
interests and "best interests," or for that matter, in favoring what
Duffy labels "civil rights," must one necessarily risk well-being?
The next two essays in this volume further explore the tension
between paternalism and autonomy. IS Law professor Charles Baron
examines what Professor Katz himself terms "the need for an excep
tion to unconditional respect for patient choice" (p. 162). In the face
of grave consequences from non-treatment and of a serious impair
ment in a patient's thinking process, Professor Katz finds it justifiable
to disregard a patient's refusal of treatment. He apparently regards
unwillingness to give reasons for one's position as the epitome of such
impairment; it is ethically relevant because this unwillingness to en
gage in conversation prevents physicians from knowing "whether they
have explained themselves satisfactorily to their patients" (pp. 162-63)
and leaves them "uncertain whether [the patients are] confused as
well" (p. 160).
As Professor Baron notes, one cannot be fully confident of Profes
sor Katz's argumentation because he clothes his justifications in a se
ries of case studies that illustrate the path he believes physicians
should follow: namely, a frank statement of frustration with the pa
tient's failure to explain her or his choice, an assurance that the physi
cian wishes to be guided by the patient's choice, and a willingness to
expend whatever time is necessary in conversation.
Professor Baron fears that this conclusion could replace medical
paternalism (i. e., providing the treatment the doctor thinks is right
despite the patient's refusal) with "psychiatric paternalism" (i.e., insis
tence on the patient's obligation to converse with the physician, backed
by the threat that the failure to provide any explanation of the choice
will lead to its being overridden). This result would be avoided, how
ever, if Professor Katz's exemplary conversations with the silent pa
tients acknowledged the physician's own needs for conversation to
avoid later feelings of guilt over having failed to fulfill ethical obliga
17.
18.

[d.
Baron, On Knowing One's Chains and Decking Them with Flowers: Limits on
Patient Autonomy in "The Silent World of Doctor and Patient," 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
31 (1987); Caplan, Can We Talk? A Review of Jay Katz, The Silent World of Doctor and
Patient, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 43 (1987).
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tions to help the patient. 19 Professor Baron thus sees greater dedica
tion to Professor Katz's own goal of mutuality in decisionmaking as
the natural corrective for what otherwise might be merely paternalism
in a new guise.
A less accepting view of Katz's thesis emerges from the next es
say, by Arthur Caplan, Assistant Director of the Hastings Center, who
believes that the mutual obligation to converse actually "puts the man
tle of authority squarely back on the physician's shoulders"20 because
many patients are reluctant to participate in the informed consent pro
cess and, yet in Katz's model, would be forced by physicians to do so.
Shades of paternalism indeed!
'
Caplan worries that other forces in the health care system may
make true communication even more difficult in the coming years. He
does not totally despair, however, but recommends changes in medical
education and even admissions standards, to improve physicians'
skills. He suggests, too, that communication may be enhanced by the
participation of other, less intimidating figures such as nurses and so
cial workers in place of physicians. This raises an interesting question
for those who share Jay Katz's desire to enhance patient autonomy:
should it be purchased at the price of undermining the idealized rela
tionship between physician and patient that Katz envisions?
The adequacy of that ideal is questioned by the final paper in this
first group.21 Professor Arthur Dyck, the Harvard theologian, agrees
that conversation leading to mutual understanding is important but
argues that self-determination not only requires that a patient be
treated in a morally responsible way but .that the patient be morally
responsible. Morally responsible choices are made within a context
that is broader than the physician-patient relationship.22
In effect, Professor Dyck is taking up one of the themes raised by
19. As Professor Katz also notes, the provision of reasons by the patient can also
help to overcome the anger, identified in R. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE
RULE OF LAW IN DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONS (1979), that can arise when a one party
in a relationship (in this case, the physician) experiences the other as all powerful, which
may then lead to abandonment of the patient as the expression of an unconscious wish to
hurt.
20. Caplan, supra note 18, at 50.
21. Dyck, Self-Determination and Moral Responsibility, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 53
(1987).
22. As Professor Dyck recognizes, Professor Katz did not fall into the trap of confus
ing "autonomous decisions" with isolated decisions; rather, he simply concentrated on the
need for changes in the physician-patient relationship and seldom took account of other
relationships. The reader should be aware that in Professor Katz's usage "autonomy" is a
psychological concept that refers to people's capacity-about which lawyers and judges as
well as physicians have many conscious and unconscious doubts-to exercise the right of
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Doctor Duffy. He points in particular to the relationship of patients to
their families, and of physicians to these families as well, as a source
both of support for the patient and of information about the patient.
As he notes, there is a long tradition in medicine of disclosing informa
tion to next-of-kin while dissembling to the patient in order to main
tain hope. Although Professor Katz would not approve of such
subterfuge, family and friends have just as important a moral role as
physicians both in promoting autonomous decisionmaking and in pro
tecting well-being, according to Professor Dyck.
Finally, Professor Dyck examines the ways in which the law has
responded when a patient is incapable of participating in the informed
consent process. He would place limits, as created by the courts and
legislature, on the choices that family and others could make about
incompetent patients in order to ensure that choices not be made that
accelerate death or add to discomfort.
II.

THE LAW AT WORK IN SPECIFIC SETTINGS

In his essay, Arthur Caplan worries that physicians will feel un
fairly criticized by Professor Katz's account of their attitudes and be
havior. What really happens in various medical settings vis-a-vis
physician-patient communication? How well does it measure up to
the law's expectations of disclosure and assent, or to Professor Katz's
call for mutual decisionmaking?
A pessimistic answer emerges from a description of obstetrical
care by a law professor with first-hand clinical experience. 23 Like Ar
thur Caplan, Professor Nancy Rhoden sees many of the limitations in
autonomy arising from patients themselves: most pregnant women
find rejecting medical recommendations virtually unthinkable. Conse
quently, obstetricians do not give these women choices, which rein
forces their passivity.
Professor Rhoden observed two paradigmatic approaches to ob
stetrical decisions. Developing the theme of uncertainty that is so cen
tral to Professor Katz's work, Professor Rhoden describes the first as a
"maximin strategy,"24 in which uncertainty drives physicians to take
aggressive steps against the worst possible outcome, regardless of the
probability of that outcome and of the drawbacks inherent in the pre
self-determination. that is, the right to make their own decisions without interference. Id.
at 54.
23. Rhoden, Informed Consent in Obstetrics: Some Special Problems, 9 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 67 (1987).
24. Id. at 68 (citing Brody & Thompson, The Maximin Strategy in Obstetrics, 12 J.
FAM. PRAC. 977 (1981».
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ventative measures themselves. Although the maximin strategy is a
legitimate response to uncertainty, neither the uncertainty nor the
choice of the strategy (and its manifestation in forms of obstetrical
treatment) is usually made clear to patients.
When a bad outcome for a fetus seems to be materializing, Profes
sor Rhoden found obstetricians turning to a second strategy, which
she terms "the only hope"25 approach to decisions: aggressive treat
ment to give the baby its last chance, even when the chances of success
are extremely low. The decision to deliver a premature baby by
Cesarean section illustrates her point, since the operation gives surviv
ing babies a better chance but also produces a large number of babies
who would have died during vaginal delivery but who survive with
serious deficits or who die after weeks or months of intensive care.
Elaborating further on the concerns raised in The Silent World of
Doctor and Patient, Rhoden finds in the obstetrical setting a great like
lihood for the divergence between physicians' views and those of their
patients. For example, physicians "scoff" at women's concerns about
the process of birth, and yet for many women process and outcome are
intertwined. Such conflicts increasingly involve other parties, as
judges are called upon to overrule women's choices that physicians
believe will endanger the fetus,26 and as legislators and regulators re
strict the range of choices that can be made about the withdrawal of
treatment from imperiled newborns.27 Unfortunately, the result of
such rulings-as Professor Katz would predict-is not only to prevent
candid and mutually respectful communication but even to drive wo
men away from the health care system, just as a person needing psy
chiatric care may avoid seeking it out of fear of being involuntarily
committed to a mental hospital.
A second setting in which to test Professor Katz's thesis is pro
vided by George Annas, health law professor at Boston University's
schools of medicine and public health. 28 In the context of an experi
mental procedure, such as implantation of an artificial heart, Professor
Annas argues that more than informed consent is needed: "an in
dependent judgment must be made that the proposed therapy ... is a
reasonable experiment from both a scientific and public policy per
25. Id. at 72-76.
26. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274
S.E.2d 457 (1981).
27. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act Amendments of 1984, 42 U.S.c.
§§ 5101-07 (Supp. II 1984); 45 C.F.R. § 1340 (1985).
28. Annas, Death and the Magic Machine: Informed Consent to the Artificial Heart, 9
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 89 (1987).
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spective. "29 Of course, Annas' argument is not really with Katz but
with the surgeons who, in his view, have used their patients' consent
not as a shield that protects the patient but as a sword to sweep aside
the objections of critics of the experiment.
The example chosen by Annas does, however, raise questions
about an issue that The Silent World of Doctor and Patient resolves
only partially; namely, are there not circumstances in which the risk of
exploitation of patients is so great that they should be protected from
their own self-determination? Professor Annas is particularly worried
that present procedures-from those of the Food and Drug Adminis
tration down to those of Institutional Review Boards at the institu
tions where research is conducted-inadequately protect terminally ill
patients, who are regarded (and may regard themselves) as having
"nothing to lose," a notion that Annas finds dramatically contradicted
by the actual experience of Barney Clark and his fellow recipients of
the Jarvik-7 heart.
Another setting that involves decisions about critically ill patients
is examined in Professor Sandra Johnson's article on legislation in sup
port of "living wills."30 Although supported as a means of protecting
patients' choices about the extent to which they wish the moment of
death delayed by medical interventions, these statutes have the same
unfortunate effect as the judicial decisions on informed consent dis
cussed by Professor Katz. According to Professor Johnson, the laws
assume sequential rather than mutual control of decisions by physi
cians and patients; thus they reinforce the long-standing tradition of
silence in the relationship.
Applying Professor Katz's observations, Professor Johnson raises
a host of objections to the so-called living-will statutes. She is con
cerned both by their failure to reach important categories of decisions,
such as treatment termination for patients who were never competent
to express a choice, and by their success in reaching many other cate
gories, into which the views of the majority about the extent of care
may be injected, even when these views differ from those of individual
patients. Further, the laws' assumption of an identity of interests be
tween physician and patient seems a doubtful foundation for "protect
ing individual control over medical treatment decisionmaking,"31 10
Johnson's view.
29.
30.

Id. at 90 (emphasis in original).
Johnson, Sequential Domination, Autonomy and Living Wills, 9 W.
L. REV. 113 (1987).
31. Id. at 128.
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If Professor Johnson is correct that even when a living will ap
pears to preserve individual control it may actually dis serve the indi
vidual, because it represents an easier path-and one more likely to
result in the refusal of treatment-than the route of real conversation
that Katz recommends, then the increasing emphasis on patients exe
cuting "advance directives" such as living wills and durable powers of
attorney32 would be something to lament. Yet, just as the existence of
informed consent requirements can be the spur for a true process of
discussion and decision, so the filling out of a directive can be the spur
for genuine conversation about a patient's goals and fears among pa
tient, physician, family, and anyone else who will be called upon to act
as a surrogate decisionmaker should the patient become incompetent.
Such a process could, of conrse, have valuable benefits for the quality
of decisionmaking even while the patient is still competent. Yet, as
Jay Katz would certainly agree, such a fortunate result is by no means
guaranteed by the existence of living-will and durable power of attor
ney statutes, nor even by the use of the documents to which such stat
utes give legal sanction.
Professor Johnson believes that lawyers are well situated to en
courage good use of advance directives; rather than relying on forms,
they can draw up individual documents tailored to the client's circum
stances and can urge the client to talk to physician and family about
the subject. In his contribution to this volume, Professor Mark Spie
gel shifts the spotlight to lawyers themselves as the objects-rather
than the creators--of the requirement of informed consent. 33 Ex
tending the general analysis of this. issue that he undertook in a pio
neering article nearly a decade ago,34 Professor Spiegel asks whether
the doctrine of informed consent is needed in the law if, as some con
tend, "large corporate clients exercise control over their lawyers rather
than vice versa."35
Besides criticizing the weakness of the data on which proponents
of the corporate-control thesis rest their case, Professor Spiegel chal
lenges the underlying proposition that attorneys for corporations lack
autonomy in their relationships with their clients. Drawing on Katz's
32. See, e.g., N. CANTOR, LEGAL FRONTIERS OF DEATH AND DYING 48, 122-23
(1987); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUS
TAINING TREATMENT 136-53 (1983).

33. Spiegel, Lawyers and Professional Autonomy: Reflections on Corporate Lawyering
and the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 139 (1987).
34. Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal
Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41 (1979).
35. Spiegel, supra note 33, at 140.
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analysis-particularly his emphasis on the need to recognize the po
tential for divergence between professional and client on means even
when they agree on a common goal-Spiegel argues that "means can
either determine ends or be ends in and ofthemselves."36 Particularly
significant is the ability of a lawyer-through what Spiegel terms inter
mediate forms of influence-to turn the issue of "what is right?" into
"what can be done, technically?"37 Spiegel admits that the greater re
liance on in-house counsel may reduce the need for informed consent
because the corporation thereby becomes an informed consumer of
legal services. Yet that would seem simply to shift the focus of in
quiry: to the extent that in-house counsel are still professionals, what
standards of disclosure and consent should govern the decisionmaking
process in which they and their client/employers engage?
Assuming that informed consent has a role in the lawyer-client
relationship,38 what special problems arise when this doctrine-devel
oped as a means of social control over the actions of physicians-is
applied to lawyers? Professor Spiegel is troubled by the notion that
informed consent would have the effect of linking lawyers more closely
to the actions of their clients, which actions often can have adverse
effects on third parties (unlike most medical treatment decisions, in
Spiegel's view).
The harm envisioned by Spiegel could arise if lawyers feel im
pelled to honor their clients' autonomy by implementing the clients'
wishes even when doing so violates other ethical precepts. Yet if in
formed consent is interpreted as Professor Katz urges, it could lead to
greater conversation between lawyer and client that could clarify the
client's true intent, which may be less objectionable than the lawyer
assumed.
The problems caused by extending informed consent to lawyering
would be exacerbated if the requirement of honoring clients' wishes is
understood to relieve lawyers of moral responsibility for the choices
made. The irony here is that this argument against informed consent
is the converse of that raised by physicians. The latter claim that in
36. Id. at 143.
37. Spiegel suggests the need for study of this intermediate form ofinftuence on deci
sions. Id. at 144 n.24. Such an examination could be broadened to include not merely the
comparable phenomenon in medicine but the ways that "cans" are translated into "musts"
in society generally. See D. CALLAHAN, THE TYRANNY OF SURVIVAL 253-69 (1973).
38. As Professor Spiegel points out, even were one to conclude that corporate clients
do not need the protection provided by informed consent requirements, it does not follow
that it is unnecessary to apply informed consent to the legal profession because individual
clients are likely to stand in relationship to their attorneys much the way individual pa
tients do toward their physicians. Spiegel, supra note 33, at 145.
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formed consent rules force them to involve patients in decisions and
follow patients' directions even when the choices patients make will
serve the patients' interests less well than would decisions made on
their behalf by their physicians. The premise is that physicians should
be trusted not only because they are more knowledgeable and dispas
sionate but because they are ethically required to put patients' interests
above all others. Conversely, the objection to informed consent that
concerns Spiegel is that the doctrine will cause lawyers to give up on
their present role as moderators of their clients' harmful, selfish behav
ior, to the detriment of third parties or general societal interests.
In Professor Spiegel's view the problem is actually that lawyers
too seldom assume the role of moral agents vis-a.-vis their clients' ac
tions. A dialogue of the type recommended by Professor Katz for
physicians and patients would thus be a good prescription for lawyers
and clients as well. It would reinforce the reality that both parties are
jointly involved in decisionmaking and bear responsibility for the
choices made-neither lawyers claiming to be neutral professionals
nor clients relying on lawyers to preempt decisions in order to achieve
an "ethical" outcome that had never been broached, much less
thrashed out, with the client. Though it may not be possible simply to
apply doctor-rules to the practice of law, The Silent World of Doctor
and Patient contains ideas that reverberate for lawyers as well as for
physicians.

III.

JUDICIAL RESPONSES

Returning to some of the themes discussed by Professors Dyck
and Johnson, the presiding judge and first assistant register of a Mas
sachusetts probate and family court explore the relationship between
Professor Katz's book and the obstacles they have seen in judicial pro
ceedings that stand in the way of the treatment needs of incompetent
patients. 39 Because of the Commonwealth's somewhat unusual insis
tence on the primacy of judicial control of treatment decisions for in
competents,40 the court-appointed guardian ad litem and counsel for
the incompetent, and then the judge her or himself, are placed in a role
with the physician comparable to that of competent patients deciding
about their own treatment. This insistence upon the involvement of a
disinterested judge seems consistent with Professor Katz's concern
39. Dunphy & Cross, Medical Decisionmaking for Incompetent Persons: The Massa
chusetts Substituted Judgment Model, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 153 (1987).
40. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
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that physicians by themselves cannot be counted on to make decisions
in their patients' true interests. But from another angle, it merely
shifts the locus of concern: can judges be counted on to play the role of
an engaged patient and not to retreat from an active conversation with
the physicians and other treaters?
Judge Dunphy and Mr. Cross find in trial judges a tendency to
defer to the medical personnel when called upon to make a "substi
tuted judgment" for an incapacitated patient. Worse yet, communica
tion may be so unclear that each participant may think that another is
actually taking responsibility for the decision. 41 Nonetheless, they be
lieve that guidelines established by the courts for the trial judge,
guardian, and counsel can ensure that a complete picture of each case
emerges from the adversarial proceedings in the courtroom.
Especially if the court proceedings are going to turn into the sort
of give-and-take discussion imagined by Professor Katz, they will cer
tainly demand a good deal of judicial time and social resources-and
the Dunphy-Cross article argues for the allocation of additional per
sonnel and funds. Concern over the wisdom of such allocation-is the
result in terms of improved decisionmaking worth the extra cost?-is
comparable to the doubts Katz found in physicians concerning the
burdens created by informed consent requirements. The authors do
not answer this question directly, but they support penalties (in licen
sure or malpractice settings) for physicians who attempt to evade the
requirements of prior judicial review.
At the opposite extreme from enforced medical deference to the
legal system lies the British approach to physician-patient relations, as
portrayed in Professor Frances Miller's contribution to this sympo
sium.42 In her view, the deference to medical decisionmaking in Eng
lish law rests on two factors. First are the deeply ingrained class (and
meritocratic) distinctions which produce the judiciary's solicitude for
its sister profession of medicine. Second, the organization of medical
care-in which general practitioners are expected to act as gatekeepers
for the National Health System-would be made much more difficult
if the gatekeepers had to inform their patients fully about possible op
tions for treatment and then attempt to implement their patients'
choices.
This is not to say, however, that British practitioners are under
41. Dunphy and Cross quote the transcript in the Saikewicz case itself, Dunphy &
Cross, supra note 39, at 159-60, which Professor Robert Burt used to illustrate just such
confusion. See R. BURT, supra note 9, at 155-57.
42. Miller, Informed Consent for the Man on the Clapham Omnibus: An English
Cure for "An American Disease"?, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 169 (1987).
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no obligation to disclose; merely that their duty does not encompass
the patient-based standard of The Silent World of Doctor and Pa
tient.43 The courts not only accepted the view that informed consent
rules would impose excessive burdens on physicians but also opined
that they would undermine trust. This view is so diametrically op
posed to Professor Katz's that the impetus for the changes he recom
mends will in England have to come from patients or medical leaders
rather than from the law.
A refreshing counterpoint to the paternalism of the British rul
ings is offered by Chief Justice John B. Doolin's opinion for the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Scott v. Bradford,44 excerpts from
which provide the concluding entry in this section of the symposium.
Professor Katz praised Scott as the "one exception" (p. 76) to the
"reasonable patient" limitation placed on disclosure by courts that
.adopted a patient-based rather than a physician-based standard. 45
It is not hard to understand the motivation for this outcome; for it
might seem harsh to judge the materiality of information by "the
patient's need," since a physician "obviously cannot be required to
know the inner workings of his patient's mind." [Waltz &
Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. V.L. REV. 628,
639 (1970).] But an objective standard shares the basic fault of the
"medical community" standard which these courts were aban
doning. Adherence to what a group in the lay community believes
to be "reasonable" may rob the patient of "the undisputed right ...
to receive information which will enable him to make a choice"
[Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.1. 606, 625, 295 A.2d 676, 688 (1972)]
as surely as will adherence to a judgment of the medical
community .
. . . Since the purpose of requiring informed consent is to allow
43. It may surprise Americans to find that Lord Diplock, in the House of Lords
decision in Sidaway v. Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hosp., [1985]2 W.L.R. 480,
actually claimed an elite position for judges (and perhaps others who have undergone the
rigors of training and experience at the Bar?): their right to be fully informed about and
involved in their medical care must be protected even though physicians were under no
such obligation toward ordinary Englishwomen and men. See id. at 500. In Blyth v.
Bloomsbury Health Auth. & Another, (May 24, '1985) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file),
the court took a similar view regarding a physician's obligation to give complete informa
tion about drug side-effects in response to direct inquiries from a plaintiff "with nursing
qualifications who could be trusted not to act irrationally because of what she was told."
Id.
44. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979).
45. McPherson v. Ellis, 305 N.C. 266, 287 S.E.2d 892 (1982), also adopted a subjec
tive standard, but the decision was of little importance since it enunciated a rule applicable
to the operation performed in 1975, while beginning in 1976, North Carolina by statute
required that an objective standard be applied.
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patient-subjects to participate in the course of therapy and research
as informed decision makers, concern should focus on whether the
patient-subject in question understood what the physician-investiga
tor was proposing to do as compared with other ways of proceeding.
To eliminate the "subjective" elements that relate to the particular
patient-subject (which lead him, for example, not to be "reason
able" in deciding about certain kinds of interventions) is to make
the informed consent doctrine an engine of depersonalization rather
than personalization. 46

IV.

THE WIDER PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNICATION

In the final contribution to this symposium, Martha Minow of the
Harvard Law School extends Jay Katz's examination of the silence
between physicians and patients into other relationships-parent
child, professional-client, stranger-stranger, and state-individua1. 47 In
all of these settings, she sees the possibility for challenging abuses of
power through communication.
As Professor Minow recognizes, there are times-when a sexually
active adolescent wants birth control devices, for example-when re
quiring conversation may result in immediate harm rather than
greater equality and shared decisionmaking. Further, civil or criminal
actions to enforce disclosure and consent rules risk destroying some
very delicate relationships. But if the participants are willing to en
gage in communication in the fashion recommended by Professor
Katz, sharing uncertainties and recognizing mutuality, Professor Mi
now suggests that patterns of dominance and dependency-with all
their potential for misunderstanding, disappointment, and harm-can
be overcome.
Some of Professor Minow's examples may seem to extend Profes
sor Katz's thesis beyond its limits,48 but it is actually a compliment to
The Silent World of Doctor and Patient that all of the contributors to
this volume were inspired to attempt just such intellectual stretching.
46.

Capron, In/ormed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123

U. PA. L. REV. 340,408-09 (1974).

47. Minow, Many Silent Worlds, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 197 (1987).
48. Labeling the relationship between a manufacturer and a consumer a stranger
stranger relationship, Professor Minow suggests that the difficulties in communication once
insulated manufacturers from liability ("absence of privity"); now a doctrine of strict liabil
ity applies to injuries caused by product defects. Playing on words, Professor Minow ar
gues that strict liability "communicates to the producer the risk of injury to the buyer." Id.
at 203. Doubtless strict liability encourages producers to internalize the costs of injuries
into their calculations but this "communication" looks remarkably different from the dia
logue that Professor Katz describes in his book.
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Through his careful look at the history and norms of one particular
profession, Professor Katz has provided insights that illuminate other
activities and the relationships on which they are built, even when his
observations about physicians and patients cannot be extended exactly
to those other relationships. Similarly, his meticulous dissection of the
judicial opinions on informed consent not only increases clarity in this
area of the law but also shows how the law sometimes falls short of its
stated aspirations, and why.
With this book, Jay Katz has begun a dialogue about the harmful
effects of reticence in a relationship that is important in all our lives.
The contributors to this symposium have joined this dialogue, in
which the editors of the Western New England Law Review and I now
invite you to participate.

